Faking Equity:  A Critique of the New York Equitable Distribution Statute as Applied to Licenses and Degrees under the O\u27Brien Decision by Giannakis, Nicole
Touro Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 1 Article 13 
May 2014 
Faking Equity: A Critique of the New York Equitable Distribution 
Statute as Applied to Licenses and Degrees under the O'Brien 
Decision 
Nicole Giannakis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Giannakis, Nicole (2014) "Faking Equity: A Critique of the New York Equitable Distribution Statute as 
Applied to Licenses and Degrees under the O'Brien Decision," Touro Law Review: Vol. 30 : No. 1 , Article 
13. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/13 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Faking Equity: A Critique of the New York Equitable Distribution Statute as 
Applied to Licenses and Degrees under the O'Brien Decision 
Cover Page Footnote 
30-1 
This comment is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/13 
 181 
FAKING EQUITY: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW YORK 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTE AS APPLIED TO 
LICENSES AND DEGREES UNDER THE O’BRIEN DECISION 
Nicole Giannakis

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The landmark decision of O’Brien v. O’Brien1 attempted to 
reform New York State’s interpretation of divorce laws and its under-
lying policy.2  This decision determined that a spouse’s professional 
license could constitute marital property if it is obtained during the 
marriage and, if so, would be subject to equitable distribution.3  New 
York enacted equitable distribution in order to remedy some of the 
inequalities that existed under former divorce laws.4  This Comment 
seeks to address two issues that have resulted from the O’Brien deci-
sion being decided in the context of the Equitable Distribution Stat-
ute, which include (1) the difficulty of placing a value on a license 
and degree and (2) the resistance of trial courts to granting adequate 
awards based on the appraised values of licenses and degrees, despite 
the intent of the statute; both of which have resulted in the statute be-
ing inequitable.  This Comment proposes that there is a need for the 
legislature to create more uniform rules of valuing and granting 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 2010, Marist Col-
lege, B.A. in Political Science and Certificate in Paralegal.  I wish to thank my supportive 
family and friends for their encouragement and understanding in all my endeavors.  Fur-
thermore, I would like to recognize Mr. Thomas Rottenberger who was integral to this 
Comment’s publication.  In addition, I would like to thank Professor Desiree Kennedy who 
voluntarily agreed to advise me throughout the writing of this Comment.  Lastly, I would 
like to thank Jonathan Vecchi and the rest of the Touro Law Review who made this publica-
tion possible. 
1 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). 
2 Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v. O’Brien: A Failed Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L. 
REV. 949, 949 (2007). 
3 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713. 
4 David Kaufman, The New York Equitable Distribution Statute: An Update, 53 BROOK. 
L. REV. 845, 845 (1987). 
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awards based on attained licenses and degrees. 
Prior to the Equitable Distribution Statute, the title theory ap-
proach was used to distribute property upon divorce.5  The Equitable 
Distribution Statute views marriage as an economic partnership and 
distributes property accordingly,6 in an attempt to remedy the unfair-
ness.7  Although O’Brien sought to minimize the inequality of previ-
ous divorce methods,8 it also created problems in its application due 
to the inability to place a proper valuation on the future return of an 
attained license or degree.9  Part II of this Comment provides a gen-
eral history of divorce law and the enactment of the Equitable Distri-
bution Statute in New York; Part III discusses the precedent estab-
lished by O’Brien and its expansion; Part IV discusses the 
circumstances in which a license or degree may be subject to equita-
ble distribution and the reasons why they fail in practice; Part V dis-
cusses the various methods of valuating degrees and licenses, and the 
imprecise task of obtaining an accurate valuation; Part VI emphasizes 
the use of judicial discretion in granting these rewards, as well as 
provides some empirical evidence to prove the effects of such discre-
tion; Part VII discusses the problems of a license or degree that is 
subject to a distributive award when it is not subject to modification; 
Part VIII explores how other states classify license and degrees and 
their approach to distributing awards; Part IX makes a proposal for 
 
5 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716; see also Ellman, supra note 2, at 950 (explaining the title 
theory as a method used by most states prior to the 1960’s, which focused on the name in 
which the property’s title was held in determining allocation of property in divorce actions). 
6 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 717; see Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity 
in ‘Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse’ Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 756 (1988) (“In equi-
table distribution jurisdictions, the question is no longer who owns the propergty [sic], but 
rather, what stake or right each spouse has in the property.  Marriage is seen as a ‘joint en-
terprise’ or ‘economic partnership’ and courts are free to distribute the parties’ accumulated 
assets as the equities of each case require, not solely according to who holds legal title.”). 
7 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716. 
8 See Ellman, supra note 2, at 950 (stating that title theory awards created a large disparity 
of property distribution between husband and wife because most title to property was held in 
the husband’s name; alimony awards were discretionary, resulting in unfair awards and fail-
ing to provide “a satisfactory substitute for property share”); see also Marsha Garrison, Good 
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce 
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 624 (1991) (suggesting that alimony was infrequently 
awarded and often went unpaid and if alimony was awarded it was “in inadequate amounts, 
and for inadequate periods of time”). 
9 Ellman, supra note 2, at 981 (“O’Brien has made it impossible for New York to follow 
the national trend toward divorce law that presumes marital property be divided equally.  
The division of marital property in New York must instead involve time-consuming and ex-
pensive inquiries into the conduct of the parties’ marriage.”). 
2
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change in the current New York treatment of licenses and degrees. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PROPERTY DIVISION IN 
DIVORCE ACTIONS 
Before the 1960’s, the “most important factor in allocating 
property” upon divorce was title.10  Upon the dissolution of marriage, 
any earnings and property held in a single spouse’s name was the 
named spouse’s as a matter of law.11  This usually resulted in dispar-
ate awards between men and women because men usually held title 
in most property.12 
In an effort to reduce these disparities the English concept of 
alimony13 was introduced, which required the husband to pay in-
stallments on a weekly or monthly basis to his former wife.14  Alimo-
ny became subject to criticism because it was infrequently awarded 
and, if bestowed, was difficult to collect.15  In addition, some “femi-
nists and women’s advocates” sought to reform alimony because it 
“perpetuated traditional notions of women as dependents and failed 
to recognize the value of a wife’s contributions as a homemaker and 
parent.”16  They also argued that alimony seemed outdated based on 
the increasing amount of women in the workforce.17  Most important-
ly, alimony did not address the underlying issue of property distribu-
tion meaning that although the wife received some type of relief, 
there was still no resolution to the inequity of property distribution 
upon divorce.18 
 
 
10 Id. at 950. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Garrison, supra note 8, at 626 (explaining that the concept of alimony “derives 
from the practices of English ecclesiastical courts,” and was awarded to the wife based pre-
dominantly on unjust enrichment); see also id. (stating that it was believed that alimony 
should only be granted if the husband was at fault for the dissolution as a means of “requir-
ing him to fulfill his marital support obligation”). 
14 Ellman, supra note 2, at 950. 
15 Garrison, supra note 8, at 624. 
16 Id. at 630. 
17 Id.; see also Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview 
of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2023 (2000) (noting that the Civil War perpetuated the movement of 
women into the workforce as women were needed as teachers and nurses). 
18 Ellman, supra note 2, at 950. 
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A. The Emergence of Equitable Property Distribution 
and its Rationale 
During the mid-1960s there was a sharp increase in divorce 
rates, which came with a need to reform divorce laws.19  As a result, 
some states began to incorporate “equitable remedies to soften the 
English rules.”20  Furthermore, reforms in allocation of property 
claims were a more appropriate solution to remedying these, as op-
posed to reforms to current alimony laws, because they were more re-
liable based on their finality.21  Allocation was also easier to enforce 
because it permitted the spouse to attach and seize other property to 
satisfy his or her judgment.22 
Reformers turned to the “ready model” of community proper-
ty in establishing the concept of equitable distribution.23  Community 
property is a concept that treats all property earned during the mar-
riage as joint property, regardless of whom holds title to the proper-
ty.24  Most states, including New York, did not accept this strict mod-
el of “equal property division” because a more flexible approach that 
allowed for individual treatment of cases was preferred.25  New York 
instead focused on “equitable property distribution” and began to de-
termine what constitutes marital property and how it should be valued 
and allocated between parties.26 
B. New York’s Enactment of Equitable Distribution 
Law and the General Laws Regarding Property in 
Divorce Actions 
In July of 1980, the New York legislature enacted the Equita-
 
19 Id. at 951; see also W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, 1 NAT’L AFFAIRS 
81, 82 (2009) (attributing the rise of the divorce rate to the “introduction of no-fault di-
vorce,” “[t]he sexual revolution,” the feminist movement, “the anti-institutional tenor,” and, 
“the psychological revolution . . . which was itself fueled by a post-war prosperity”). 
20 Ellman, supra note 2, at 951; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 630 (“Alimony thus 
was nowhere abolished, although many states enacted new standards that emphasized the use 
of alimony for transitional, ‘rehabilitative’ purposes to limit its use and duration.”). 
21 Ellman, supra note 2, at 951. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 628 (stating that the difference between commu-
nity property and equitable distribution is that “equitable property distribution applied only 
at divorce; in an intact marriage, legal title prevailed”). 
25 Garrison, supra note 8, at 631. 
26 Id. 
4
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ble Distribution Statute in an attempt to ensure a fair distribution of 
marital property upon dissolution of the marriage, which is premised 
on an economic partnership theory.27  The statute was meant to con-
sider both parties’ “contributions . . . [to the marriage] as . . . 
spouse[s,] . . . wage earner[s] and homemaker[s].”28  Thus, it takes 
into account “both direct and indirect contributions” of each spouse.29  
The Equitable Distribution Statute shifts from the concept of granting 
assets due to necessity, to a theory based on equity and fairness be-
cause the “assets represent the capital product of what was essentially 
an economic partnership.”30 
New York’s Domestic Relations Law (DRL) categorizes 
property into two groups to determine distribution upon divorce: sep-
arate property and marital property.31  The statute’s definition of sep-
arate property is an express and infinite listing, which includes prop-
erty that was acquired before marriage, property that was acquired by 
descent or gift from a third party, compensation from personal injury 
claims, “property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of 
separate property” unless the appreciation was due to contributions of 
the spouse, and property that has been established as separate by writ-
ten agreement.32  In contrast, marital property is defined as “property 
acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the 
execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a mat-
rimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held.”33  Un-
der this statute, marital property is notably broad, while separate 
property is restrictive to the explicit listing.34  Thus, the broad defini-
tion of marital property in the statute comes with the problematic ex-
 
27 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846; see also Kenneth R. Davis, The Doctrine of O’Brien v. 
O’Brien: A Critical Analysis, 13 PACE L. REV 863, 879 (1994) (“The court based its analysis 
on the policy of the Equitable Distribution Law, which recognizes that a marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership and that non-financial contributions are as significant as financial ones.”). 
28 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715. 
29 Id. at 718. 
30 Id. at 717 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
31 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 852. 
32 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(d)(1)-(4) (McKinney 2010). 
33 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(b)(1)(c); see also O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715 (defining 
marital property as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and 
before the…commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which the title 
is held”). 
34 Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1986); see also Raviv v. Raviv, 545 N.Y.S.2d 
739, 740 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that there is a presumption in favor of finding for marital 
property and the burden is on the defendant to overcome that presumption). 
5
Giannakis: Faking Equity
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
186 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
pense of giving “judges too much discretion” under the equitable dis-
tribution doctrine, which has created “unpredictable and sometimes 
arbitrary results.”35 
Furthermore, the statute explicitly states its application to dis-
tribution, maintenance, spousal agreements, and other matters.36  
Maintenance awards are either written agreements or court orders 
where one spouse must pay sums in fixed intervals to the other, for a 
definite or indefinite period of time.37  The concept of maintenance 
was introduced to provide the spouse with an opportunity to achieve 
economic independence, as opposed to relying on lifetime depend-
ence and support from the former spouse.38  The award terminates 
upon death of either party or upon the recipient spouse’s remar-
riage.39  The resulting impact of maintenance awards have been con-
troversial because under this model of distribution, there is an in-
creased risk that the contributing spouse will never receive adequate 
consideration for his or her contributions.40 
The statute also describes a distributive award, which is a 
written agreement between the parties or a court order that provides 
for payments by one spouse to another “in lieu of or to supplement, 
facilitate or effectuate the division . . . of property,” to be paid in one 
lump sum or throughout a period of time.41  A distributive award is 
often used in situations where the division of the marital property is 
impracticable or illegal, and therefore a monetary award is more ap-
propriate than the actual distribution of property.42  A distributive 
award allows for the concept of equity, wherein one spouse is com-
pensated for their contributions, as opposed to a grant of awards to 
facilitate economic dependence.43  A major distinction between a dis-
tributive award and a maintenance decree is that under Domestic Re-
lations Law (DMR) § 236(B)(9)(b) a decree of maintenance may be 
 
35 Garrison, supra note 8, at 632; see also id. at 730 (emphasizing the troubling fact that 
“the wife’s average share of net marital property tends to decline as the couple’s net worth 
increases”). 
36 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 849. 
37 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(1)(a). 
38 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 853; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 640 (stating the ob-
jective of the maintenance award “suggests that courts should . . . award maintenance for 
short-term, ‘rehabilitative’ purposes”). 
39 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 854. 
40 Garrison, supra note 8, at 640. 
41 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(b). 
42 Litman v. Litman, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (App. Div. 1983). 
43 Id. 
6
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modified, whereas under DMR § 236(B)(5)(e) a distributive award 
“once made, is not subject to change.”44  This has become a particu-
larly important distinction in New York based on current precedent 
classifying licenses and degrees as marital property, subjecting them 
to equitable distribution granted by distributive awards.45 
The Equitable Distribution Statute was passed in an effort to 
promote fairness and equity, but in the years following its enactment, 
the courts did not rule in a manner that would effectuate its goals.46  
There was a period in which New York State Courts blatantly disre-
garded the statute and did not properly account for all the marital as-
sets.47  This is demonstrated in Conner v. Conner,48 in which the trial 
court held that “an academic degree was not subject to evaluation as 
marital property.”49  The court acknowledged that both partners made 
contributions to the marriage with an expectation that they would be 
entitled to the benefits.50  However, the court emphasized that both 
partners knew of the possibility of dissolution, and therefore ruled 
that it was not relevant to add the spouse’s future potential earnings 
in the disbursement of property.51 
III. THE LANDMARK DECISION OF O’BRIEN V. O’BRIEN 
In 1985, the landmark decision of O’Brien established a firm 
precedent proclaiming that it depicted the true meaning and intent of 
the statute, with regards to valuation, distribution and classification of 
marital property.52  In O’Brien, the parties were married in April of 
1971, and at that time, both were employed as teachers.53  The hus-
band returned to school to complete premedical courses in order to 
apply to medical school.54  In 1973, the parties moved to Guadalajara, 
 
44 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720. 
45 Id. at 716. 
46 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 863. 
47 Id. at 847. 
48 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 482 (App. Div. 1983). 
49 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 867. 
50 Id. at 865. 
51 Id. at 867. 
52 Id. at 846 (stating that the equitable distribution doctrine is based on the premise that 
marriage is an economic partnership and, therefore, the legislature attempted to ensure that 
there would be a fair distribution of marital property upon the dissolution of marriage). 
53 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713. 
54 Id. at 714. 
7
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Mexico and the husband became a full time medical student.55  Dur-
ing the course of his studies, both parties contributed to “living and 
educational expenses.”56  However, it is uncontested that the wife 
“contributed all of her earnings to their living and education expenses 
and that her financial contributions exceeded those of plaintiff.”57  
The parties returned to New York, and in October of 1980, the hus-
band, plaintiff, was licensed to practice medicine.58  He commenced 
the divorce action two months later.59  At the commencement of di-
vorce, the parties’ only valuable asset was the husband’s newly ac-
quired medical license, and the central issue was whether this asset 
was marital property, subject to equitable distribution.60 
Plaintiff argued that professional licenses were not marital 
property because they do not satisfy the traditional definition of prop-
erty.61  The New York Court of Appeals responded to this argument 
by stating that ultimately, a professional license is property that has 
value, which can be calculated by the money lost while it was ac-
quired, as well as the enhanced earning capacity granted to the hold-
er.62  Furthermore, the court went on to say that marital property is 
not governed by traditional property concepts because it is a unique 
statutory creation and should be construed according to the language 
provided in the statute.63 
The court created New York precedent stating that a license is 
in fact marital property under the meaning of DRL § 236 and is sub-
ject to equitable distribution.64  Thus, the statute was interpreted to 
 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 713. 
61 Id. at 717; see also Conner v. Conner, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 493 (App. Div. 1983) (Titone, 
J., concurring) (“As the term is commonly understood, a professional license or degree pos-
sesses none of the attributes of ‘property.’  It has no monetary value on the open market and 
cannot be transferred, assigned, sold, pledged or inherited.”). 
62 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 717. 
63 Davis, supra note 27, at 869; see also Kaufman, supra note 4, at 869 (stating “[m]arital 
property is simply a way of defining those items of value to which spouses may have an eq-
uitable claim on the basis of both the remedial statute and the marital relationship.  There is 
no common law property interest remotely resembling marital property.”). 
64 Davis, supra note 27, at 863; see also O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 580-81 (holding that 
“plaintiff's medical license constitutes ‘marital property’ within the meaning of Domestic 
Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) and that it is therefore subject to equitable distribution pursu-
ant to subdivision 5 of that part”). 
8
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mean that “an interest in a profession or a professional career poten-
tial is marital property which may be represented by direct or indirect 
contributions of the non-title holding spouse, including financial con-
tributions and nonfinancial contributions made by caring for the 
home and family.”65  The court explained that because the license 
was attained through joint efforts it is marital property.66 The court 
sought to compensate Mrs. O’Brien based on the sympathetic cir-
cumstances of the case, but unfortunately “[w]hat started with a poor-
ly reasoned decision in O’Brien has spawned a line of cases which 
have left the lower courts adrift in a sea of illogic.”67 
A. Expanding O’Brien 
Following the O’Brien decision, a New York State Supreme 
Court was confronted with the issue of whether the precedent of 
treating licenses as marital property applied only to licenses or 
whether it could be extended and applied to other types of education-
al advances such as Master’s degrees.68  In McGowan v. McGowan,69 
the defendant husband argued that his wife’s Master’s degree for 
teaching should be considered marital property.70  The New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department recognized a 
distinction between professional licenses and academic degrees be-
cause a degree did not necessarily grant the legal right to participate 
in a particular profession; it simply allowed the recipient to acquire 
more knowledge about a specific discipline.71  However, the court re-
ferred to O’Brien for guidance and recognized that the significant as-
pect of that case was not whether the holder was in a particular prac-
tice, but rather whether the holder had enhanced his or her future 
earning capacity.72 
The court concluded that there was no reason to form a dis-
 
65 Davis, supra note 27, at 872. 
66 Id. at 870. 
67 Peter Bronstein and David Typermass, From O’Brien to Keane: Building on a Weak 
Foundation, 41 N.Y.S.B.A. FAMILY L. REV. 3, 3 (2009). 
68 Davis, supra note 27, at 874. 
69 535 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1988). 
70 Id. at 992. 
71 Id. at 993; see also Judge v. Judge, 851 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 2008) (“An aca-
demic degree may constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, even though the 
degree may not necessarily confer the legal right to engage in a particular profession.”). 
72 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
9
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tinction between degrees and professional licenses when categorizing 
separate and marital property, and therefore a Master’s degree should 
be considered marital property.73  The court in McGowan clearly held 
true to the principal of equitable distribution and concluded that the 
non-titled spouse would receive a just portion of the assets, regardless 
of whether the enhanced earnings were a result of a license or a de-
gree.74 
IV. ESTABLISHING THAT THE LICENSE OR DEGREE SHOULD BE 
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
There are three required elements for a distributive award to 
be made to a spouse, which include (1) an enhanced earning capacity 
attributable to the license or degree; (2) the non-titled spouse contrib-
uted to the license or degree attainment; and (3) the license or degree 
has value.75  Therefore, even though licenses and degrees are to be 
classified as marital property because they result in an enhanced earn-
ing capacity, it does not automatically subject them to equitable dis-
tribution.76  The accrual of the marital property77 and the non-titled 
spouse’s contributions to its attainment are both relevant factors in 
determining whether the license or degree will be subject to equitable 
distribution.78 
A. Accrual of Marital Property 
The court uses timing as a point of reference in order to de-
termine whether a license or degree will be subject to equitable dis-
tribution in a divorce proceeding.79  There are three scenarios that of-
 
73 Id. at 994; see also Judge, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (holding that the wife’s MBA degree 
enhanced her earning capacity and was subject to equitable distribution); see also Jayaram v. 
Jayaram, 880 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (holding that the husband’s MBA degree although “not an 
actual prerequisite to his employment at the brokerage firm” it nonetheless increased his 
earning capacity and constituted marital property). 
74 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995. 
75 Philip Sherwood Greenhaus, Equitable Distribution of a Never Used Professional Li-
cense, 66 N.Y. ST. B. J. 20, 23 (1994). 
76 Id. 
77 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95. 
78 Evans v. Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (App. Div. 2008). 
79 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995; see also Spence v. Spence, 731 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (App. 
Div. 2001) (holding “[t]he husband’s enhanced earning capacity as an investment banker 
[was] not marital property subject to equitable distribution” because he “earned his MBA, 
Series 7 license, and Series 63 license four years before the marriage”). 
10
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ten arise with regards to timing disputes.80  First, when the require-
ments for a degree or license were completed before the marriage, but 
the physical award or certificate was not obtained until after the mar-
riage.81  Second, when most courses were completed during the mar-
riage, but not all.82  Finally, when a degree is obtained before a mar-
riage, but additional work is required and completed during the 
marriage to allow one to properly enter the field.83 
In McGowan, the first circumstance presented itself.  The is-
sue in the case was whether a certain teaching certificate, awarded 
two weeks after the marriage, would be considered marital property.84  
Plaintiff argued that her education to obtain the certificate was com-
pleted before the marriage to the defendant, and therefore should not 
constitute marital property.85  Defendant countered by reiterating the 
holding in O’Brien, which stated that licenses acquired during the 
marriage, constitute marital property.86  The court in McGowan made 
it evident that defendant’s argument was a far too simplistic interpre-
tation and that the policy behind O’Brien’s ruling was to remedy a 
social injustice by providing compensation for a spouse, who to her 
detriment, supported the other spouse through an educational pro-
gram and then was refused the benefits as a result of divorce.87  The 
court held that the “license or degree will constitute marital property 
only to the extent that it is attributable to the work during the mar-
riage.”88  Therefore, the court held that plaintiff’s teaching certificate 
was not marital property because her increased skill, knowledge, and 
increased earning capacity were earned prior to the marriage.89 
In the case of Kyle v. Kyle,90 the second timing issue present-
ed itself, which is when all courses have not been completed in order 
 
80 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995. 
81 Id. at 994. 
82 Kyle v. Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (App. Div. 1990). 
83 Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (App. Div. 1990). 
84 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 991. 
85 Id. at 992. 
86 Id. at 994. 
87 Id. at 995. 
88 Id.; see also Allocco v. Allocco, 578 N.Y.2d 995, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that “the 
successful completion of the civil service examinations, which resulted from the knowledge 
represented by these degrees as well as the direct studies for such examinations, enhanced 
the Defendant’s earning capacity, and should be considered as marital property subject to 
equitable distribution”). 
89 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 991. 
90 Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781. 
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to obtain a license.91  In this case, at the time the divorce was com-
menced, the husband still needed two courses to obtain his principal’s 
license.92  The New York Appellate Division, Second Department 
ruled that the license was not marital property because it was not ac-
quired during the marriage, reasoning that mere anticipation of a li-
cense in the future does not qualify for equitable distribution.93 
In Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld,94 a third timing issue arose in 
which the parties married after the spouse had obtained his medical 
degree, but still required a one year program in order to obtain his li-
cense in New York.95  During this one-year program, his wife was the 
sole income provider.96  The New York Appellate Division, Second 
Department held that under these circumstances, the non-licensed 
spouse was entitled to an interest in the medical license.97 
The issue of timing is one that may conflict with the ultimate 
purpose of equitable distribution, which is to ensure that there is a 
fair distribution of marital property upon dissolution of marriage, and 
therefore it takes into consideration the contributions that both parties 
have made, whether direct or indirect.98  In circumstances where a 
court considers the timing that the license or degree was received the 
result can sometimes lead to inequity, as seen in Kyle.99   
The intended purposes of the statute are undermined if a li-
cense or degree is automatically exempted from marital assets based 
on technicalities and despite the substantial contributions put forth by 
the non-titled spouse.100  If trial courts were properly carrying out the 
intentions of the statute the substantial contributions of the non-titled 
spouse would require an award to promote equity and fairness.101 
 
91 Id. at 783. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.; see also Berkman v. Berkman, 563 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (explaining 
that mere academic credits accumulated during a marriage did not yield an enhanced earning 
capacity and therefore were not subject to equitable distribution). 
94 Shoenfeld, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500. 
95 Id. at 502. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 503. 
98 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846. 
99 Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 783. 
100 See O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715 (stating the intention of the Equitable Distribution 
Statute is to consider both parties contributions to the marriage as spouses, wage earners, and 
homemakers). 
101 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846. 
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B. Contributions of the Non-Titled Spouse 
Although the time of the accrual of the property is relevant in 
the court’s analysis to determine whether the property is marital and 
subject to equitable distribution, there is a greater focus on the contri-
butions that the non-titled spouse has made in its attainment.102  Ac-
crual of the license or degree can sometimes be helpful in proving 
that the non-titled spouse did not make substantial contributions to its 
attainment.103  The non-titled spouse seeking the award has the bur-
den of showing that he or she made a substantial contribution in the 
attainment of the degree or license in order to obtain a portion of the 
enhanced earning potential.104  In one case, the Appellate Division 
stated: 
Where only modest contributions are made by the 
nontitled spouse toward the other spouse’s attainment 
of a degree or professional license, and the attainment 
is more directly the result of the titled spouse’s own 
ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is ap-
propriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of 
that enhanced earning capacity.105 
In Farrell v. Cleary-Farrell,106 the husband was entitled to a 
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s den-
tal hygienist license.107  The New York Appellate Division reasoned 
that the wife “exerted extraordinary efforts to complete her degree 
and obtain her license.”108  The wife worked while at school, took 
care of the children, was responsible for the household chores and 
even gave birth mid-semester but still completed her classes.109  
While the wife attended school, the husband remained as the main 
source of income for the family, assisted with the children, main-
tained the outside yard work and supported his wife throughout her 
 
102 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995. 
103 Id. 
104 Esposito-Shea v. Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (App. Div. 2012); see also O’Brien, 
489 N.E.2d at 715; see also Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (App. Div. 2001). 
105 Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (citations omitted). 
106 761 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2003). 
107 Id. at 359. 
108 Id. at 360. 
109 Id. 
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schooling.110  Despite this, the husband’s contributions were not 
deemed substantial because during this time it was shown that he ad-
vanced his own career because he worked long hours and engaged in 
business related travel.111 
Similar to the approach of marital property, the non-titled 
spouse can obtain the appreciated value of separate property if they 
can prove that they made substantial contributions, which result in 
the appreciated value.112  In Price v. Price,113 the husband owned an 
interest in a family appliance business.114  The husband acquired this 
interest as a gift prior to the marriage, which DRL § 236(B)(1)(d) 
classifies as separate property.115  The business thrived and upon di-
vorce the wife sought to obtain a part of the business’ appreciated 
value, she claimed her indirect contributions as a homemaker and 
mother contributed to the increased value of the business.116  The is-
sue became whether the appreciated value of the business could be 
constituted as marital property, because the wife’s indirect contribu-
tions helped facilitate the increased value of the separate property.117  
The New York Court of Appeals held that the Equitable Distribution 
Law allowed for the increased value of one spouse’s separate proper-
ty to be considered marital property, if the increased value was a re-
sult “in part to the indirect contributions or efforts” of the other 
spouse.118  In this decision, the court looked beyond the statutory lan-
guage and factored in the policy considerations, which: 
reflect[] an awareness that the economic success of the 
partnership depends not only upon the respective fi-
 
110 Id. 
111 Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (noting that “[w]hile defendant attended school and re-
ceived her license as a dental hygienist, plaintiff was busy advancing his own career, gaining 
promotions and doubling his salary during the marriage.  Under all of these circumstances, 
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff a modest portion of defend-
ant's enhanced earning capacity.”). 
112 Davis, supra note 27, at 879; see also Hartog v. Hartog, 647 N.E.2d 749, 754 (N.Y. 
1995) (stating that the non-titled spouse need only show that the titled spouse actively partic-
ipated to some degree in the appreciation to an asset to classify the appreciation of that asset 
as a marital asset). 
113 503 N.E.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. 1986). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 685-86. 
116 Id. at 689. 
117 Id. at 685. 
118 Price, 503 N.E.2d at 685; see also Majuskas v. Majuskas, 463 N.E.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. 
1984) (holding that increased value in pension rights is marital property because it is the 
product of continued employment during the marriage). 
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nancial contributions of the partners, but also on a 
wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint en-
terprise, such as homemaking, raising children and 
providing the emotional and moral support necessary 
to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissi-
tudes of life outside the home.119 
Therefore, if the non-titled spouse made substantial contributions to 
the enhanced earnings or appreciated values, they should be compen-
sated and be granted an award that adequately reflects their contribu-
tions.120 
The New York Court of Appeals held that licenses and de-
grees are marital property subject to equitable distribution because it 
sought to remedy a social injustice “that results when one spouse, to 
the detriment of his or her own fulfillment, labors in order to support 
the other spouse through an educational program, only to be divorced 
before the economic rewards of that program are realized.”121  The 
rationale behind this approach is that when a spouse agrees to take on 
an educational venture by the other, he or she makes financial sacri-
fices with an expectation that they will both eventually enjoy the 
benefits of that degree or license.122  Furthermore, the spouse often 
chooses to make a financial sacrifice and postpone living a certain 
lifestyle with the expectation of having an even greater reward due to 
these sacrifices.123 
However, as seen in the above analysis, a license or degree 
could be considered for equitable distribution only when the non-
titled spouse made substantial contributions to its attainment, which 
reveals that this law is in effect reimbursement to the non-titled 
spouse.124  Contrary to the intent of the statute, trial courts’ decisions 
are not treating the couple as equals in an economic partnership that 
accounts for all their contributions, including both monetary and 
household.125  “Post-divorce income surveys have uniformly shown 
 
119 Price, 503 N.E.2d at 687 (internal quotations omitted). 
120 Davis, supra note 27, at 879. 
121 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995. 
122 Davis, supra note 27, at 890. 
123 Id. 
124 Ann Weiss, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for Exclud-
ing Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1327, 1351 (1983). 
125 Id.; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 726 (stating that “divorce law should protect the 
justifiable expectations of marriage partners that are based on marital commitment and day-
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that women’s per capita income and standard of living tend to decline 
substantially following divorce, while those of men tend to in-
crease.”126  This disparity is mainly attributed to the fact that under 
the Equitable Distribution Statute “women’s contributions as home-
makers are typically undervalued.”127  Five years after the statute was 
enacted a study revealed that the average marital property award to 
the wife was thirty percent.128  Furthermore, a study done by Legal 
Awareness for Women, Inc. (LAW) discovered that out of twenty-
seven divorced women, seventy-four percent were with husbands 
who were in a professional practice or entrepreneurial venture and 
only two received distributive awards.129  These results led to the 
conclusion that there are “apparent inequities resulting from the divi-
sion of intangible property”130 which can be attributed to either “the 
interpretation of the statute or [to] the language of the statute it-
self.”131 
V. VALUATION OF A LICENSE OR DEGREE 
Once it is established that a professional license or degree is 
in fact marital property that should be subject to equitable distribution 
based on the case specific circumstances, the court then faces the 
problem of how to place a value on it.132  Although, Equitable Distri-
bution Law does not require an equal division of marital property, it 
requires a process that promotes fairness.133  In order to properly car-
ry out the intent of the statute, the value of the enhanced earnings re-
sulting from the attainment of the license or degree should not be 
overestimated or underestimated.134  However, it should account for 
appreciation in value135 and should account for the entirety of the 
length in time that the license or degree will produce enhanced earn-
 
to-day sharing.”). 
126 Garrison, supra note 8, at 633. 
127 Id. at 632. 
128 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 863. 
129 Id. at 864. 
130 Id. at 863-64. 
131 Id. at 864. 
132 Scott Willoughby, Professional Licenses as Marital Property: Responses to Some of 
O’Brien’s Unanswered Questions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 151 (1987). 
133 Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. 1985). 
134 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
135 Price, 503 N.E.2d at 685. 
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ings.136 
A. Calculating Enhanced Earnings 
One of the major criticisms to O’Brien is based on the diffi-
culty of placing a value on professional licenses and degrees.137  To 
determine the value, a specific emphasis on the “enhanced earnings” 
must be made.138  In O’Brien the court held that: 
If the license is marital property, then the working 
spouse is entitled to an equitable portion of it, not a re-
turn of funds advanced.  Its value is the enhanced 
earning capacity it affords the holder and although fix-
ing the present value of that enhanced earning capacity 
may present problems, the problems are not insur-
mountable.139 
In O’Brien, the value of the enhanced earning potential that is 
afforded by the license or degree was established through a simple 
calculation.140  The court compared the average income of a college 
graduate and that of a person holding such degree or license (in this 
case a general surgeon) between the year the plaintiff’s residency 
would end and the year that plaintiff reached age sixty-five (signify-
ing age of retirement), while taking into account appropriate adjust-
ments for federal income taxes, inflation rates, interest rates and real 
interest rates, thus establishing a “true value.”141  However, this cal-
culation approach is an extreme oversimplification and fails to take 
into consideration the many practical factors that contribute to one’s 
enhanced earning potential afforded by their degree or license.142 
 
136 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714; see also Davis, supra note 27, at 895 (“Ordinarily, the 
person’s working life is deemed to continue until age sixty-five.”). 
137 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152. 
138 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 2010). 
139 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 718. 
140 Id. at 714. 
141 See id.   
The court, after considering the life-style that plaintiff would enjoy from 
the enhanced earning potential his medical license would bring and de-
fendant's contributions and efforts toward attainment of it, made a dis-
tributive award to her of $188,800, representing 40% of the value of the 
license, and ordered it paid in 11 annual installments of various amounts 
beginning November 1, 1982 and ending November 1, 1992.  
Id.  
142 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152. 
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There is a high risk of miscalculations and overestimations 
when placing a monetary value on degrees and licenses.143  The cir-
cumstances of one’s professional career are often unpredictable due 
to the many factors that contribute to an individual’s professional 
successes or failures.144  A degree or license may authorize a person 
to practice in a certain field, but that has no bearing on whether that 
person will financially succeed in that field.145  In effect, “a profes-
sional degree or license represents nothing other than a possibility of 
future earnings.”146  Furthermore, despite obtaining the educational 
credentials, many individuals choose not to practice in that field,147 or 
sometimes fall victim to circumstances that do not permit them to 
work in the field, despite their degree; such as an accident that ren-
ders them physically incapable.148  “There is no guarantee” that the 
license or degree will actually result in the amount of enhanced earn-
ings that the economists statistically determine.149  Therefore, placing 
a value on such an asset is nothing more than speculation.150 
Some argue that placing a value on enhanced earning poten-
tial, although speculative, is appropriate because: 
the complexity of calculating the present value of a 
partially exploited professional license is no more dif-
ficult than the problem of computing wrongful death 
damages or the loss of earning potential that is occa-
sioned by a particular injury.  Nor does it lead to sig-
nificantly more speculation than is involved in the 
now-routine task of valuing a professional practice for 
the purpose of making a distributive award.151 
However, this argument is flawed because it is contradictory to the 
objectives of the Equitable Distribution Statute.152  The purpose of 
this statute is to divide marital property in a fair manner, not to com-
 
143 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
144 Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (App. Div. 1982); see also Willoughby, 
supra note 132, at 152 (“[A] surgeon may work longer hours, experience more pressure, or 
accept more responsibility than the average college graduate does in his job.”). 
145 Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938. 
146 Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 24 (emphasis added). 
147 Davis, supra note 27, at 873. 
148 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring). 
149 Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 22. 
150 Id. 
151 McSparron, 662 N.E.2d at 751. 
152 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1349. 
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pensate one spouse for the amount they expected to profit from their 
partner during the marriage.153  The current application of the statute 
“treats the couple as business partners, with the investing wife antici-
pating a monetary return.”154  In addition, when two consenting adults 
agree to engage themselves in the institution of marriage, they enter 
knowing the risks of loss that can occur upon dissolution,155 contrary 
to a tort action where the victim does not consent to the loss.156 
Another reason why a comparison to a tort case is flawed is 
because in a wrongful death claim there can be no way to ascertain 
actual earnings of what the individual will make in the future.157  
However, in the instance of valuing a professional license or degree 
the courts have the burden of guessing future earnings based on prior 
and outdated performance.158  Valuing a license or degree is an im-
precise task that can have severe consequences, which interfere with 
an individual’s personal decisions about their lifestyle.159  This risk is 
so severe that the valuation based on enhanced earnings should not be 
utilized, especially because there are various alternative approaches 
that may be used.160 
B. The Role of Experts in Valuation 
The critical factor is not that the holder can practice a particu-
lar profession, but rather that there is proof, in the form of expert tes-
timony, that the license has a monetary value because it substantially 
enhances “the future earning capacity of the holder.”161  The valua-
tion of a license or degree in court significantly depends on expert 
 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1351. 
155 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 867. 
156 Weiss, supra 124, at 1349. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See Sophia Hollander, After Divorce, a Degree is Costly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, 
at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324481204578180132 
637628330.html (statement of Willard DaSilva, Dr. O’Brien’s attorney, comparing the deci-
sion to indentured servitude) (“Dr. O’Brien would have to pursue a career in surgery in order 
to earn the money to pay for the debt assigned to him by the court, and to force him to do 
something he really didn’t want to do . . . .”). 
160 Bronstein & Typermass, supra note 67, at 3 (“In O’Brien v. O’Brien, the New York 
State Court of Appeals deviated from the vast experience of every other state in the country 
when it decided that professional licenses constituted marital property and that such licenses 
should be valued and divided between spouses.”). 
161 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
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testimony.162  It is clear that judges are given substantial discretion in 
regard to expert testimony when establishing the value of a license or 
degree.163  Experts generally establish that the value of marital prop-
erty is based on “the date of the commencement of the matrimonial 
action;” however, the trial court has the discretion to change the valu-
ation date to something more appropriate and distribute an award ac-
cordingly.164  Furthermore, the trial court is responsible for evaluating 
the testimony and giving it the proper weight from the evidence in-
troduced.165 
In Esposito-Shea v. Shea,166 the potential earning capacity of 
the wife’s law license was ultimately determined by a “battle of the 
experts.”167  In this case, both experts sought to determine the wife’s 
earning potential with a law degree, as compared to her earning po-
tential without it.168  To this end, they each factored in her work-life 
expectancy and reached two separate figures, which were compared 
and used to determine her enhanced earning capacity due to her law 
degree.169  In order to compute the wife’s earnings without a law de-
gree, her expert used her actual employment history and statistical 
data of how much individuals with a Bachelor’s degree earned in her 
geographical location during the pertinent time period.170  The hus-
band’s expert used the wife’s “employment history in the period prior 
to obtaining her law degree,” which significantly lowered her earning 
 
162 Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96; see also Chew v. Chew, 596 N.Y.S.2d 950, 
953 (Sup. Ct. 1992): 
The husband failed to adduce any expert proof at trial despite a full op-
portunity to do so and therefore, has waived any claim to a distributive 
award based upon the value of the Master’s Degree.  The failure to ad-
duce expert testimony at trial is fatal to a claim for equitable distribution 
which was first made in the defendant’s attorney’s post trial brief and 
which set forth, for the first time, calculations as to value. 
Id. 
163 Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796. 
164 Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359. 
165 Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796; see also Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (“While 
plaintiff presented expert testimony that reached a different conclusion, it was for [sic] Su-
preme Court to evaluate this testimony, assign to it whatever weight the court believed it de-
served and arrive at determinations that were supported by the credible evidence introduced 
at trial.”). 
166 941 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 2012). 
167 Id. at 795. 
168 Id. at 796. 
169 Id. at 795. 
170 Id. at 796. 
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capacity.171  Ultimately, the court rejected the husband’s expert and 
reasoned that had the wife not attended law school she would have 
pursued employment that required her Bachelor’s degree.172 
Most notably, after the court accepted the wife’s expert valua-
tion of her degree, the husband was awarded only ten percent of its 
value.173  This “battle of the experts” approach does not seem to pro-
mote the goals of divorce law and specifically the Equitable Distribu-
tion Statute, which are to produce reasonably consistent results, pro-
mote negotiation and settlement to avoid litigation, and to foster 
efficiency to lower legal costs.174  In terms of cost effectiveness, the 
financial burden of hiring an expert to value a license or degree175 re-
sults in a minimal monetary return due to the inadequate awards 
granted by judges.176  The lack of guidelines in the statute leads to in-
equity because more money is often spent trying to place a value on 
the license or degree than the actual return awarded for it.177  In addi-
tion, “[v]ague rules also tend to favor the litigant with greater re-
sources . . . [who] can afford to ‘wait it out.’ ”178 
VI. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND JUDGE DISCRETION 
Judges have the most discretion in divorce cases, in compari-
son to “any other field of private law,”179 and this has only expanded 
 
171 Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 797 (noting that although “[t]he husband maintains that he is entitled to a greater 
degree of the value of the wife's law degree because he was the family's primary wage earner 
during the parties’ marriage and arranged his work schedule so that he could care for their 
children while the wife attended law school. However, these sacrifices represented ‘overall 
contributions to the marriage rather than an additional effort to support [the wife] in obtain-
ing [her] license.’ ”). 
174 Garrison, supra note 8, at 727. 
175 19 Carmody-Wait 2d § 118:163. 
176  See Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (holding that the husband was entitled to a 
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s dental hygienist license);  
see also Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (granting the husband ten percent of the wife’s 
law degree); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (App. Div. 2001) (granting plaintiff 
“ten percent of [] enhanced earnings” from her teaching certificate); Kriftcher v. Kriftcher, 
874 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154-55 (App. Div. 2009) (granting the wife ten percent of the enhanced 
earnings of her husband’s law degree). 
177 19 Carmody-Wait 2d, supra note 175. 
178 See Garrison, supra note 8, at 727; see also Litman, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (explaining 
there is no set formula, but rather valuation is based on the expert testimony and the trial 
court will develop an award based on the facts before it). 
179 Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?  An Empirical Analysis of 
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within the past two decades.180  The trial court is “granted substantial 
discretion [to] determin[e]” what is equitable under any circumstance 
in this area.181  In New York, judges are given thirteen factors182 to 
consider and a “catch-all clause”183 which are to be used to distribute 
property equitably amongst the parties.184 
An empirical analysis by Professor Marsha Garrison,185 at-
 
Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 411 (1996). 
180 Id. at 404 (explaining that in the past two decades there has been a shift to discretion-
ary distribution in titled based property, the adoption of gender-neutral divorce laws, and the 
removal of fault based awards in alimony). 
181 Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359. 
182 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 2010) listing the factors the court 
shall consider when equitably distributing property as: 
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at 
the time of the commencement of the action; 
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; 
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence 
and to use or own its household effects; 
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the 
marriage as of the date of dissolution; 
(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage; 
(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part; 
(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution 
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having 
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and ser-
vices as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career 
or career potential of the other party; 
(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property; 
(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; 
(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or 
any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic 
desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any 
claim or interference by the other party; 
(11) the tax consequences to each party; 
(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; 
(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimo-
nial action without fair consideration. 
183 Id. (listing the last factor to be considered as “any other factor which the court shall 
expressly find to be just and proper.”). 
184 Garrison, supra note 179, at 410. 
185 See id. at 430. 
[a]nalysis of judicial decision making under the Equitable Distribution 
Law is part of a larger research project aimed at determining the impact 
of the change in legal standards upon divorce outcomes.  For analysis of 
the statute's overall impact, data were drawn from the court files of ap-
proximately 900 divorces filed in 1978, two years before enactment of 
the Equitable Distribution Law, and from the files of approximately 900 
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tempted to reveal how judges in New York utilize these factors in 
their decisions.186  The study concluded that in the first few years fol-
lowing the enactment of the Equitable Distribution Statute, cases de-
termined by a judge, as opposed to settlement agreements, had a 
strong tendency to result in distributing most marital assets relatively 
equally.187  Nevertheless, when evaluating the particular distribution 
of couples who owned a professional degree, husbands were found to 
receive “a disproportionate share of the net marital assets” resulting 
from the degree.188  It was found that: 
[t]o the extent that disproportionate distribution to one 
spouse was predictable, it thus tended to reflect mone-
tary contribution to the marriage instead of need.  The 
husband’s ownership of a large percentage of marital 
assets, of a business or professional license, and a 
higher value for net marital assets were all associated 
with an increased likelihood that the husband would 
receive a disproportionate percentage of marital net 
worth.189 
Thus, the data reflects that despite the Equitable Distribution Statute, 
judges often do not award proportional shares to the non-titled 
spouse, and when they do, it is usually based on monetary contribu-
tions as opposed to the intended factors of the statute, such as one’s 
contributions as a parent and homemaker.190  Garrison’s study further 
concluded that what was most notable about property division in di-
vorce is that there was no data that reflected a consensus or trend as 
 
divorces filed in 1984, four years after the law's passage.  In order to ex-
amine regional variation in case outcomes, cases were selected in equal 
numbers from three diverse counties:  one from New York City, one 
from the suburban belt surrounding it, and one representative of the 
mixed urban/rural upstate region.  Analysis of the case data revealed that 
the average property distribution varied little over the research period but 
that the frequency and duration of alimony awards declined markedly.  
Case outcomes for both time periods were also highly variable; the pas-
sage of the law thus appeared to have little effect in improving the con-
sistency of results. 
Id. 
186 Id. at 406-08. 
187 Id. at 452. 
188 Garrison, supra note 179, at 458. 
189 Id. at 460. 
190 Id. at 465. 
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to how judges deviated from the new trend of equal division.191 
The critics of judicial discretion assume that uniform rules 
will suffice in divorce law and that individualized decisions are not 
necessary.192  The current shift in divorce law, which is no longer a 
fault based system, and the “enhanced role of dependency prevention 
as a theme of divorce law” has eliminated the need for individualized 
judgments.193  However, equitable distribution of property has some-
how increased discretionary decision-making.194  This has been at-
tributed to the emotionally charged competing views of the nation on 
marital roles, gender, and individual obligations in a marriage.195  
Thus, the legislature has decided not to create a rule-based system.196 
VII. THE INABILITY TO MODIFY A DISTRIBUTIVE AWARD OF A 
LICENSE OR DEGREE 
New York takes the approach of classifying licenses and de-
grees as marital property, subject to equitable distribution set by the 
standard in O’Brien.197  This approach has various implications on 
divorced parties, one of which includes the inability to modify or 
amend such awards after the decree is final.198  DRL § 236(B)(9)(b) 
states in part that: 
[w]here, after the effective date of this part, a separa-
tion agreement remains in force no modification of a 
prior order or judgment incorporating the terms of said 
agreement or order as modified shall supersede the 
terms of the prior agreement and judgment for such 
period of time and under such circumstances as the 
court determines.199 
The effect of this section is that unlike a decree of maintenance or 
child support, once a distributive award is finalized it “is not subject 
 
191 Id. at 466. 
192 Id. at 417. 
193 Garrison, supra note 179, at 421. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 422. 
196 Id. at 422-23. 
197 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring). 
198 Id. 
199 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 2010). 
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to change.”200  This is best represented in the case of Siegel v. 
Siegel.201 
In Siegel, during the marriage, the parties acquired “valuable 
furniture and artwork.”202  Upon divorce, the furniture and artwork 
were appropriately classified as marital property and were distributed 
accordingly within the trial court’s judgment.203  A month later, Die-
go Giacommenti, the artist who designed most of the pieces, died.204  
The husband requested a new trial and alleged that based on the 
changed circumstances of the artist’s death, the artwork and crafted 
furniture had increased in value and therefore, resulted in inequity in 
the divorce decree.205  The court denied the motion.206  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed and stated that the denial of a new trial was proper 
because “even if we assume that certain assets, such as the 
Giacommetti artwork, substantially increased in value since the time 
of the trial, this would have no effect on the validity of the equitable 
distribution of property ordered by the court.”207  The court explained 
that if they allowed the husband’s modification of asset judgments, 
due to an unforeseen change in value that took place after trial, it 
would “undermine the finality of judgment in matrimonial ac-
tions.”208  Thus, if a degree or license were subject to such a rule, it 
too would not be subject to an equitable modification.209 
A professional license or degree is distinct from other proper-
ty, such as artwork and should not be classified as “marital property 
subject to distribution upon divorce.”210  A professional license or 
degree far exceeds the traditional aspects of property, including 
“transferable value, assignability or inheritability.”211  A degree or li-
cense, does not solely represent an enhanced earning capacity, but ra-
ther reflects the individual’s hard work, efforts, and personal sacrific-
es, which the monetary value of the license or degree does not 
 
200 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring). 
201 523 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1987). 
202 Id. at 521. 
203 Id. at 522. 
204 Id. at 521. 
205 Id. at 522. 
206 Siegel, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 522. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1346. 
211 Id. 
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account for.212  Although the Equitable Distribution Statute attempts 
to disregard these inherent disparities by stating this is a unique statu-
tory creation,213 it avoids the problems that accompany creating a 
new form of property, such as the uncertainty of placing a value on 
such property.214 
Some supporters of the statute argue “that an education[] de-
gree is [similar] [to] other intangible items of property”, such as pen-
sion benefits that have not vested.215  However, this comparison is not 
persuasive because pension benefits have a quantifiable dollar 
amount, which is certain to vest, unlike professional licenses and de-
grees in which the monetary value is based on “highly uncertain fu-
ture events.”216  The court seeks to achieve finality in divorce judg-
ments but this is extremely unjust when one is to place a value on 
property that is entirely speculative and cannot be modified despite 
changed circumstances.217  The projected future earnings may create 
hardships to the licensed spouse if the spouse fails to attain the aver-
age earnings of the profession.218  This may be attributable to various 
factors such as an economically depressed profession, the inability to 
find employment, a physical impairment as a result of an accident or 
unforeseen illness, and choosing a certain sub-section within that pro-
fession that pays below average salary.219  If the licensed spouse is 
simply not making the projected earnings, it will result in unjust in-
equities and place a severe hardship on them with no available reme-
dy.220 
Moreover, the courts do not address the contradictory results 
of licenses and degrees being classified as marital property.221  Mari-
tal property is to include any property acquired during the marriage 
 
212 In Re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d at 77. 
213 Davis, supra note 27, at 869. 
214 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1347. 
215 Id. at 1346. 
216 Id. at 1347. 
217 Id.; see, e.g., O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that “if 
the assumption as to career choice on which a distributive award payable over a number of 
years is based turns out not to be the fact (as, for example, should a general surgery trainee 
accidentally lose the use of his hand), it should be possible for the court to revise the distrib-
utive award to conform to the fact”). 
218 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1347. 
219 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153. 
220 Id. 
221 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1348. 
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and therefore subject to equitable distribution.222  However, the assets 
resulting from a professional license or degree would be acquired af-
ter the marriage, yet these future earnings are still being subject to 
equitable distribution.223 
The most troubling factor of classifying licenses and degrees 
as marital property subject to distributive awards is placing a highly 
speculative value on one’s career choice, especially because they 
cannot be modified.224  An individual may decide that he or she no 
longer wants to practice in a particular field, regardless of his or her 
attained degree.225  However, “[b]y not allowing modification, the 
legislature prevents some licensed spouses from altering their career 
paths before they have even settled in their chosen field of prac-
tice.”226  This is an extremely unjust consequence, which imposes a 
life choice on the licensed spouse.227 
VIII. REJECTING LICENSES AND DEGREES AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY AND THE VARIOUS APPROACHES ADOPTED BY 
OTHER STATES 
Many courts realize that inequity occurs when one spouse has 
completed an educational license or degree, while the other spouse 
has held back their individual professional goals in an effort to sup-
port their spouse.228  Despite this fact, those courts have refused to 
classify the degree or license as marital property.229  These courts do 
not allow for such classification of degrees and licenses mainly based 
on the practical difficulties of placing a monetary value on licenses 
and degrees,230 as well as the underlying concern that the award 
would be not be subject to modification.231  Due to these concerns, 
most states do not classify licenses and degrees as marital property, 
 
222 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713. 
223 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1348. 
224 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 149. 
229 See, e.g., Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. 1987). 
230 McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993. 
231 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) 
(holding that finality of such a judgment is a major concern based on the fact that placing a 
value on a degree or license is speculative, unpredictable, and if a severe inequity arises, the 
court will not be able to remedy the situation). 
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and instead have found other ways to achieve equitable distribution 
that allows for modification of judgment orders.232  Two alternative 
approaches include: (1) increased alimony or maintenance awards; 
and (2) reimbursement alimony. 
A. Increased Alimony or Maintenance Awards 
Those states that allow for increased alimony or maintenance 
awards provide that when determining the asset amount to grant, 
“earning capacity of the degree holder and the contributions of the 
nondegree holder may be considered.”233  Most of these states rely on 
General Law c. 208 § 34, which: 
is clearly broad enough to allow courts to consider the 
increased earning potential engendered by a profes-
sional degree in determining an award of alimony and 
assignment of the estates of the parties.  Neither the 
degree or license itself, however, nor the increased 
earning capacity of the degree holder is an asset sub-
ject to assignment.234 
The case of Drapek v. Drapek235 conveys the approach and ra-
tionale of increased alimony.  In Drapek, the husband appealed from 
a judgment of divorce that ordered him to pay his wife “annual in-
stallments and [a portion] of his gross earnings.”236  The husband 
contended that it was an error to classify his medical degree and in-
creased earnings based on that degree as “part of his estate subject to 
equitable assignment under G.L. c. 208, § 34.”237  He further argued 
that the “alimony awarded was an abuse of discretion.”238  In order to 
properly assess whether the trial court erred, this court referred to 
General Law c. 208, § 34, which provides for the specifications of al-
 
232 Harvey G. Landau, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half Full? 78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 46 
(2006) (noting that “New York is the only state to adhere to the view that a non-transferable 
advanced degree, license, or certification constitutes marital assets subject to distribution.”). 
233 Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950.  For other examples of states that use this approach, see, 
e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987); Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 75 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1981); Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of 
Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1986). 
234 Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950. 
235 503 N.E.2d 946 (N.Y. 1987). 
236 Id. at 947. 
237 Id. at 947-48. 
238 Id. at 948. 
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imony for either of the parties.239  This statute provides what the trial 
judges must240 and may consider when awarding alimony.241  Under 
the statute, the court may consider “the contribution of each of the 
parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of 
their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a 
homemaker to the family unit.”242  The Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts held that the husband’s medical degree and resulting enhanced 
earning capacity could not be considered part of his estate; however, 
on remand, the judge may amend the alimony in order to reflect the 
value of his degree and enhanced earnings.243  The court rejected the 
classification of a professional degree or license as a marital asset 
subject to division by emphasizing the speculative nature of assigning 
such values and the court’s inability to modify such a judgment; it 
therefore reasoned that a judgment of alimony was more appropri-
ate.244 
As previously stated, both alimony and maintenance awards 
can be paid to a party “for a definite or indefinite period of time, to 
meet the reasonable needs of [the] party.”245  The judiciary regards 
increased alimony or maintenance awards as “rehabilitative meas-
ure[s], available only until the spouse is able to enter the labor 
force.”246  This can be quite problematic when applied in circum-
stances when a spouse has been out of the work force for a long peri-
od of time, because it is often difficult and highly unlikely that the 
spouse will be able to obtain a career and automatically become self-
supporting.247 
B. Reimbursement Alimony 
Some states take another approach and provide for reim-
 
239 Id. at 948. 
240  Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 948; see also G.L c. 208 § 34 (stating that the trial court is re-
quired to consider “the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, 
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for 
future acquisition of capital assets and income.”). 
241 Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 948. 
242 Id. at 948; see also G.L. c. 208 § 34. 
243 Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950. 
244 Id. at 949. 
245 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 871. 
246 Id. at 872. 
247 Id. at 873. 
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bursement alimony.  Reimbursement alimony is a: 
circumstance[] where a supporting spouse should be 
reimbursed for the financial contributions he or she 
made to the spouse’s successful professional training.  
Such reimbursement alimony should cover all finan-
cial contributions towards the former spouse’s educa-
tion, including household expenses, educational costs, 
school travel expenses and any other contributions 
used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her 
degree or license.248 
The theory behind reimbursement alimony is that one spouse sacri-
ficed or postponed his or her own educational goals in order to sup-
port the household, and therefore he or she should be compensated 
through either a “lump sum or a short-term award to achieve econom-
ic self-sufficiency.”249  In Mahoney v. Mahoney,250 the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey had to decide whether an M.B.A. degree ob-
tained by a spouse during the course of a marriage should be catego-
rized as property and subject to equitable distribution upon a divorce 
proceeding.251  The court rejected the classification of an M.B.A. de-
gree as marital property and did not subject such a degree to equitable 
distribution.252  The court reasoned that future earnings are extremely 
speculative and the finality of such a distribution was too risky be-
cause there was no remedy if a property distribution were to result in 
unfairness.253  The court decided, in order to avoid this inherent un-
fairness related to the classification of a degree as property, to take a 
cost approach.254  The cost approach reimburses a spouse by award-
ing him or her a certain amount, which is calculated by the cost of 
supporting the other spouse who obtained the degree.255  New York 
law rejects this approach on the basis that it refuses to view a mar-
 
248 Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 534.  For more examples of states that use this approach see, 
e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 
S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988). 
249 Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 535; see also Landau, supra note 232, at 46 (stating that “New 
York is the only state to adhere to the view that a non-transferable advanced degree, license, 
or certification constitutes marital assets subject to distribution.”). 
250 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982). 
251 Id. at 530. 
252 Id. at 536. 
253 Id. at 532. 
254 Id. at 533. 
255 Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 533. 
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riage as a “business arrangement in which the parties keep track of 
debits[,] credits, [and] their accounts to be settled upon divorce.”256 
IX. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
The purpose of the Equitable Distribution Statute is to pro-
mote a sense of fairness between spouses upon dissolution of mar-
riage.257  The statute is premised on the belief that marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership and both parties must be accounted for with 
regards to their contributions, whether it is via the workforce or as a 
homemaker.258  Despite attempts to achieve equity through the land-
mark decision of O’Brien, establishing professional licenses as mari-
tal property and its later expansion to include educational degrees in 
McGowan, the struggle to attain equity still continues, as these cases 
have resulted in their own injustices.259  The difficulty of applying the 
provisions of the Equitable Distribution Law to property such as li-
censes and degrees has resulted in inequity, which is inconsistent 
with the legislative intent of the statute.260 
There has been a consistent trend within the trial courts in the 
state of New York granting exceedingly modest awards, which ex-
emplifies the hesitation of granting awards based on the enhanced 
earnings of licenses or degrees.261  Some argue that the “statutory 
framework for the distribution of marital assets is being intentionally 
disregarded by the courts.”262  However, another explanation for such 
modest awards may be the lack of guidance with respect to valuating 
licenses and degrees provided for in the statutory language.263   
Consequently judges remain extremely conservative when 
granting these awards to avoid inequity.264  Some may argue that val-
uing a degree or license is not unlike valuing other indeterminable as-
 
256 Id. 
257 Davis, supra note 27, at 870. 
258 Id. 
259 Ellman, supra note 2, at 981. 
260 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 864. 
261 See Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (holding that the husband was entitled to a 
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s dental hygienist license); see 
also Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (granting the husband ten percent of the wife’s law 
degree); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (App. Div. 2001) (granting the plaintiff 
only ten percent of the enhanced earnings of the teaching certificate obtained by spouse). 
262 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 847. 
263 Id. at 864. 
264 Ellman, supra note 2, at 981. 
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sets, including unvested pension benefits265 or loss of earning poten-
tial in wrongful death or personal injury claims, because they all re-
quire a degree of speculation.266  However, it should at least be rec-
ognized by the legislature that license and degrees are in fact a unique 
type of property.267  Licenses and degrees do not follow the tradition-
al notions of property because they are highly personal to the owner 
in that it reflects their own efforts and abilities and, furthermore, their 
value is only attributable to these personal efforts.268  If a new form of 
property asset is to be created, the legislature must respect and recog-
nize the need for guidelines in how to value such property.269 
The O’Brien decision must be overturned in that it calls for 
valuating licenses and degrees based on a party’s enhanced earning 
capacity.  The Equitable Distribution Statute must be amended270 to 
provide better guidance for courts to use in how to place a value on 
licenses and degrees and thereafter how to determine a proper award 
based on the value of the license or degree.271  The legislature should 
implement a formula to use when valuating licenses and degrees, 
which will allow for more “simplicity and predictability.”272  Some 
may argue that rigid rules and guidelines are unworkable in divorce 
law because the sensitive nature of the cases requires individualized 
decisions to reflect the unique family circumstances of each case.273 
However, the best solution is to provide a formula that can be applied 
consistently,274 yet allows for flexibility to ensure that the individual-
ized needs of the spouse’s are met in this sensitive area of law.275 
 
265 Weiss, supra note 124, at 1346. 
266 McSparron, 662 N.E.2d at 751. 
267 Davis, supra note 27, at 869. 
268 James Mastracchio & Nicholas Mastracchio, Professional License Value in a Divorce, 
66 CPA JOURNAL ONLINE 1, 1 (1996), available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajourn 
al/1996/1296/features/professional.htm. 
269 Davis, supra note 27, at 869. 
270  See Tim Grant, The High Cost of Divorce Breaking Up can be Really Hard to do in a 
Tough Economy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2012), available at www.post-
gazette.com/stories/.../the-high-cost-of-divorce-663830/ (showing that the intended goals of 
the Equitable Distribution Statute are still relevant as “[d]ivorce [] can be a rude financial 
awakening for women whose main job was running the household and caring for the chil-
dren” because although many of these women have college degrees “they have been out of 
work for so long that technology has swept by them.  Their skills have become obsolete.”). 
271 Garrison, supra note 179, at 521. 
272 Garrison, supra note 8, at 731. 
273 Garrison, supra note 179, at 405. 
274 Id. at 412. 
275 Id. at 405 (stating “fairness to the many families affected by divorce law demands 
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The best formula to be used under the Equitable Distribution 
Statute for placing a value on a license or degree and thereafter grant-
ing an equitable award based on its value would provide that if a 
spouse has significantly contributed to the student spouse’s attain-
ment of the degree or license, then there should be a ten year payout 
based on actual earnings.  The percentage awarded during this ten 
year payout should be based on a sliding scale beginning at ten per-
cent and increasing in ten percent increments based on the amount of 
contributions put forth, and leveling off at fifty percent of the titled 
spouse’s income as the maximum award.  A spouse’s contributions 
should only be considered “significant” as to apply to the statute 
when the contributing spouse has been with the student spouse for at 
least half of the class credits or hours required for the attainment of 
the license or degree.  If the contributing spouse meets such require-
ments then there should be a presumption that they be awarded at 
least ten percent, with the possibility of increased benefits based on 
the specifics of their contributions.  The court should utilize the pre-
sent factors listed in the Equitable Distribution Statue assuming that 
the more factors satisfied, the greater the payout percentage.  Fur-
thermore, the court should classify “significant contributions” as both 
financial contributions and one’s role in being a homemaker or par-
ent.276  The formula would continue to apply if the spouse is remar-
ried because its main purpose is to promote a sense of fairness be-
cause even though one spouse may remarry and move forward, the 
past sacrifices still remain relevant.  The application of this formula 
will remedy the two most problematic issues of the statute, which 
have resulted in inequity.277 
The ten-year timeframe provided in the formula quells three 
major concerns that may accompany this formula.  These include the 
issue of the titled spouse postponing their career, the issue of estab-
lishing a career long enough to obtain the average earnings in the pro-
fession and the issue of promoting finality in divorce.  The ten-year 
period is long enough that it is unlikely that most titled spouses will 
postpone their careers to avoid payment and allows the titled-spouse 
 
standards that achieve predictable and consistent outcomes”). 
276 See Weiss, supra note 124, at 1351 (reflecting that N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 ac-
counts for contributions of both monetary and household). 
277 Two most problematic issues of the statute, as suggested by this Comment are: (1) the 
difficulty of placing a value on a license and degree and (2) the resistance of the trial courts 
to grant adequate awards based on the appraised value of the licenses and degrees, both of 
which have resulted in the statute being inequitable.  
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attain the average earnings of someone in the profession, yet it is 
short enough to promote a sense of finality in divorce. 
Moreover, the ten-percent increment adjustment is a good 
starting point for distributions because it is small enough that it will 
have a modest impact for those who did not significantly contribute 
to the attainment, yet the increase is large enough to provide those 
who made greater contribution to attain a larger award.  A ten-percent 
increment is more desirable than a smaller increment because it will 
be harder for the court to use arbitrary discretion to award judgments.  
For example, if the sliding scale of distributions were only based on 
two percent increments it would be difficult to distinguish why a 
judge awarded two percent to one litigant, as opposed to an award of 
four percent to another litigant. 
The idea of equitable distribution was intended to promote a 
sense of fairness in the treatment of women upon divorce.278  This 
above formula still accounts for spousal contributions as well as fi-
nancial contributions and it recognizes the efforts of being a parent or 
a homemaker, which satisfy the historical intent of the enactment of 
this law.279  As seen throughout this Comment, the current methods 
of valuation resulted in a bias towards women, rather than benefiting 
them.280  The provided method will force a more consistent approach, 
which will ultimately result in achieving greater awards for women. 
This formula also will remedy the current issues of timing and 
contributions involved in distributing an award281 because of its clear 
rules.  If the contributing spouse was married to the titled spouse for 
at least half of the credits or hours required for the license or degree 
attainment then it is deemed that their contributions are substantial.  
This portion of the formula ultimately merges the accrual of marital 
property and the substantial contribution factors to give more direct 
guidance to the courts.  If the Kyle decision282 were to be analyzed 
under this approach, the court would find that because the contrib-
uting spouse was married to the student spouse for more than half of 
the attainment of the credits required for the principal’s license then it 
 
278 Ellman, supra note 2, at 981 (replacing the previous title theory approach, which 
granted property to the person who held title in their name, usually men). 
279 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715. 
280 Garrison, supra note 179, at 414-15. 
281 Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 23. 
282 See Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (exemplifying the circumstances when a court deemed 
that a principal’s license was not deemed marital property subject to equitable distribution 
because the titled spouse still required two courses to complete it). 
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would be said that she has substantially contributed to its attainment.  
Thereafter the contributing spouse would have obtained at least ten-
percent of actual earnings from the titled spouse for ten years, unless 
the titled spouse283 can overcome this presumption. 
The next issue that this formula will remedy is the inability to 
accurately calculate the enhanced earning potential that is afforded to 
the titled spouse based on the attainment of the degree or license.284  
Placing a value on enhanced earnings is entirely too speculative,285 
especially because the earning potential can drastically vary based on 
the individual’s career goals and economic job market of the field, 
which the titled spouse has no control over.286  The formula presented 
allows for a reasonable solution that will provide for greater equity 
amongst both spouses.  The formula suggests that there should be a 
ten-year payout based on actual earnings.  This allows for the non-
titled spouse to regain some of the fruits of its attainment and to 
compensate them for his or her efforts, without placing a heavy bur-
den on the titled spouse to provide earnings that he or she may not ac-
tually be obtaining, or forcing them to stay in a field that they may 
not want to remain in.  This distinct rule takes away the uncertainty 
and speculation that is irrationally applied to property as unique as 
licenses and degrees, which ultimately will lead to greater equity. 
The suggested formula also alleviates the problem of the high 
emphasis placed on experts.287  The use of experts will not be neces-
sary to predict enhanced earnings, but rather earnings are determined 
from actual payment records during the ten-year period.  However, 
experts might be used to demonstrate the percentage of actual earn-
ings that the non-titled spouse should be entitled to.  This will not be 
as significant of an issue because of the presumed ten percent that 
will be given to the contributing spouse.  The less reliance on experts 
will likely lead to a fairer playing field and result in more equitable 
results.288 
The issue of avoiding duplicative awards289 will also be re-
 
283 See Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (stating that the current approach requires the 
burden to be on the non-titled spouse to demonstrate that they made a substantial contribu-
tion to its attainment). 
284 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152. 
285 Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 22. 
286 Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153. 
287 Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795-97. 
288 Garrison, supra note 8, at 727. 
289 Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 688 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80 (App. Div. 1999). 
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solved based on this formula. The non-titled spouse will receive a 
portion of the actual earnings, meaning that if the license or degree 
develops into a practice then the non-titled spouse is entitled to a por-
tion of it.  There will be no need to distinguish between the amounts 
received for future earning potential and the amount received from an 
established practice.  If a practice is in existence then the actual earn-
ings will be determined based on the income it produces. 
Judicial discretion has long accompanied the matrimonial 
field and it is not likely to be completely eliminated.290  However, the 
particular data involving awards of licenses and degrees reflects that 
non-titled spouses are frequently awarded disparate monetary awards, 
contrary to the intent of the statute.291  One possible explanation why 
judges have so sparingly and modestly applied this statute may be at-
tributable to the lack of guidelines.  A heavy burden is placed on the 
judge to attain equity without firm guidelines.  Furthermore, the re-
minder that the award will be final and not subject to modification 
further exacerbates this burden.  Amending the statute to provide a 
proper valuation formula for licenses and degrees will result in judges 
more consistently applying the law in a way that promotes equity.292 
The inability to modify the award, which is a paramount issue 
in placing a value on licenses and degrees and subjecting them to dis-
tributive awards,293 will not be as problematic because the guidelines 
set forth in the formula allow for the award to balance itself to create 
equity.  For example, the concurring opinion by Justice Meyer in 
O’Brien expresses the concern over inequity that may result if a sur-
geon lost their hand after an award was granted based on his en-
hanced earnings as a working surgeon.294  If the situation arose that a 
surgeon lost his hand and no longer worked as a surgeon or could ob-
tain a comparable salary, the proposed formula would afford an equi-
table solution because the payout would reflect his actual earnings 
therefore relieving him of the obligation to pay an amount that he can 
not afford. 
As seen, other states have chosen to reject licenses and de-
grees as marital property and compensate non-titled spouses by other 
 
290 Garrison, supra note 179, at 404. 
291 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 864. 
292 Garrison, supra note 8, at 727. 
293 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring). 
294 Id. 
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means;295 however, New York has held true to its precedent as set 
forth in O’Brien.296  If New York wants to continue to abide by this 
precedent there must be a change in the statute that will recognize the 
problems of classifying licenses and degrees as marital property and 
it must make proper changes to provide for equity. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The Equitable Distribution Statute should be seen as a great 
accomplishment in terms of attempting to promote a progressive leg-
islation, which seeks to level the playing field by treating both spous-
es as equals in marriage.  The statute had hopeful intentions to pro-
vide protection to those underrepresented in the past and attempted to 
balance the inequalities that have once plagued our legal system.  The 
O’Brien decision further attempted to validate the intentions of the 
statute by classifying licenses and degrees as marital property subject 
to equitable distribution.  However, the facts of the O’Brien case 
were clearly sympathetic and there was an obvious need to remedy 
the wife in these unjust circumstances.  Therefore the court held that 
the degree should be marital property subject to equitable distribu-
tion.  However, the continued precedent of this case, of classifying 
licenses and degrees as marital property, has proven inequitable. 
The difficulty of placing a value on the degree or license and 
the trial courts moderate awards based on its valuation, does not in 
fact result in just outcomes.  If New York wants to continue the prec-
edent of the O’Brien decision a change to the Equitable Distribution 
Statute is essential.  The Statute must be amended to create more 
specified guidelines of how to value licenses and degrees and what 
percentages they should be awarded because overbroad legislation of-
ten results in inequity due to the inability to create consistent and 
predictable results.  Some legal fields such as divorce law are far too 
individualized to provide for standard uniform rules that would be 
appropriately applied to all.  However it is important to provide some 
uniform guidelines to ensure that the statute will properly be applied 
and result in its anticipated purposes, an equitable remedy. 
 
 
295 See, e.g., Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950. 
296 See Landau, supra note 248, at 46. 
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